logical competence that subjects may or may not possess and other more peripheral moderator factors that serve to (a) yield both false positive and false negative judgments of the psychological reality of competence and (b) operate to influence the actual use of competence once it is acquired (Overton, 1985; Overton & Newman, 1982) . Failure to make this distinction can lead to anomalous findings suggesting that young children reason according to the rules of logic (e.g., Hawkins, Pea, Glick, & Scanner, 1984; Rumain et al. 1983) and young adults do not (e.g., Griggs, 1983; Wason, 1983) .
The present investigation focuses on the acquisition of propositional logical competence. This competence is modeled in a Piagetian framework by the structures of the formal operational level of reasoning (Beth & Piaget, 1966; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) . Within Piagetian theory the development of reasoning is characterized as a succession of increasingly powerful logical systems or competencies. Thus, sensorimotor intelligence constitutes a system of logic, that is, a competence, but it is a logic of action; preoperational intelligence forms the transition from the logic of action to a logic of classes and relations that constitute concrete operational intelligence; and the logic of classes and relations ultimately yields to and becomes integrated with propositional logic, which constitutes the competence of formal operational intelligence.
From this perspective, successful solutions to problems involving "if, then" statements may occur prior to the formal operational level to the extent that task material and performance criteria permit class logic solutions (Kuhn, 1977) , or to the extent that the problems permit solutions based on the interpretation of "if, then" statements as a promise or as a causal relationship (Geis & Zwicky, 1971 ). However, a formal understanding of the conditional as a propositional relationship requires the coordinated transformations of formal operational structures. It is these structures that allow the individual to reason systematically with logical relationships within a complete propositional system. Thus, given the conditional "if p then q," reasoning at the formal operational level involves recognition that "p and not q" is the inverse or negation of the conditional; "if q, then p" is the reciprocal; and "not p and q" is the inverse of the reciprocal. This recognition is necessary, both to distinguish the conditional from other logical forms (e.g., the biconditional, "p if and only if q"), and to systematically understand the conditions under which the conditional can be tested for its truth or falsity.
As suggested earlier, investigations of the acquisition of propositional logical competence must also be concerned with more peripheral factors that operate as moderators of competence. According to this competencemoderator-performance model (Overton, 1985; Overton & Newman, 1982) , any cognitive test performance is a function of both the individual's level of logical competence and various moderator variables that influence the application of competence to actual problems. Moderator variables may include both organismic factors (e.g., motivation, memory, attention) and situational factors (e.g., task structure and demands, contextual factors). As applied to the assessment of formal conditional reasoning, one particularly important moderator variable is task interpretation. When presented with "if, then" statements and asked to draw appropriate inferences, subjects are under no necessary obligation to interpret the task demands according to a formal conditional interpretation. If subjects do, in fact, produce varied interpretations of "if, then" statements, then depending on the response criteria employed in an investigation, findings may lead to the conclusion that children at very young ages understand the conditional (e.g., admitting causal and other interpretations of "if, then" and scoring such interpretations as acceptable) or that individuals, regardless of age, do not understand the conditional (i.e., admitting various interpretations but maintaining strict formal conditional scoring).
In a series of studies O'Brien and Overton (1980 have shown that when special procedures are introduced to correct for faulty causal or biconditional interpretations, the competence necessary for formal conditional reasoning appears by the 12th grade and is sustained into the late adult years (Overton, Franco, & O'Brien, 1984) . The general procedures, referred to as contradiction training, present subjects with an inference task containing an incomplete conditional rule, that is, "If a worker is years of age, or older, then that person will receive at least $350 each week." This is followed by a series of exemplars, such as a 20-year-old who makes $50 each week, a 60-year-old who makes $600 each week, and so forth. Following each exemplar the subject is required to decide what, if anything, can be inferred about the missing age in the rule. During early trials there is a tendency to interpret the rule as a causal, biconditional, or some other nonconditional form. However, after several trials, subjects are presented with an exemplar that directly contradicts earlier faulty inferences. For subjects who have acquired the competence required for conditional reasoning, this contradiction has the effect of alerting them to the possibility of the inverse of the reciprocal of the conditional, that is, "not p and q," a recognition that is necessary for formal conditional reasoning in that it differentiates causal or biconditional forms from the conditional. As a consequence, subjects who have acquired requisite competences respond appropriately on later test trials, and this effect generalizes to other conditional reasoning tasks. For subjects who have not acquired the requisite competence, the introduction of the contradiction is irrelevant to their behavior because they do not have the formal conditional interpretation as an accessible understanding of "if, then" statements.
One purpose of the present study then is to further explore the development of the requisite competence for conditional reasoning in the context of the manner in which task interpretation influences the application of this competence. Task interpretation is primarily determined by the situational demands and structure of the problem. A second purpose of this study is to examine a more organismically relevant moderator variable, that is, attention, as it is assessed by cognitive style.
There are several reasons to suspect that cognitive style may serve as a moderator of logical competence. Given the developmental trend in the ability to distinguish between conditional and other "if, then" interpretations found by O'Brien and Overton (1980 , it may be that highly successful performance on conditional reasoning problems requires a slower, more systematic approach to the task. Brodzinsky (1982) found that performances on concrete operational tasks were better for children who were found to be reflective rather than impulsive on the Matching Familiar Figures (MFF) test; style was also found to predict well to performances 1 year later. O'Brien and Overton reported that competent adult subjects who were tested on conditional syllogism tasks following earlier contradiction training make different ratings of problem difficulty than did subjects who did not have the requisite competence. This difference in rating demonstrates an awareness of the need for care and effort. Furthermore, the experimenters who tested the subjects in these earlier studies noted informally that among competent subjects those who did not give rapid responses seemed more likely to benefit from training. It is of interest then, to examine whether cognitive style moderates performance on conditional reasoning tasks and whether style mediates the effectiveness of contradiction training.
It should be noted that several criticisms have been raised concerning the use of the MFF as an index of style. Block, Block, and Harrington (1974) argued that there is a discrepancy between the conceptual definition of the reflectivity-impulsivity dimension which emphasizes latency, and its frequent aperationalization which includes error scores. Moreover, they contend that either an accurate-inaccurate categorization scheme or the notion of ego resiliency are more appropriate for describing data from a number of studies. Finally, they question the validity of employing a task that ostensibly taps the tendency to withhold response on problems that contain response uncertainty (Kagan & Messer, 1975) to generalize to the broader, commonly held definitions of "Reflective" and "Impulsive'* personalities. Others argue that the usual double-median split of latency and error scores used to categorize subjects results in low test-retest reliability, loss in statistical power for correlations, and the disregarding of a fair percentage of subjects who don't meet the criteria for Slow/Accurate (i.e., "reflective") and Fast/Inaccurate (i.e., "impulsive") categories (Ault, Mitchell, & Hartmann, 1976; Egeland & Weinberg, 1976) . In the present study, however, the MFF is used as an index of preferred approach to tasks that vary in degree of uncertainty and as an index of attention to detail. It is not the intent of this study to make broad personality attributions to subjects. Attention to detail is viewed as a potential moderator of conditional reasoning competence. Furthermore, the problems of double-median splits is remedied by converting MFF scores into composite standard scores. This conversion improves reliability, increases statistical power, and also includes all subjects in analyses (Egeland & Weinberg, 1976; Salkind & Wright, 1977 ).
The present study, then, investigated both the situational moderator factor of task interpretation and the organismic moderator factor of cognitive style. It was not expected that either variable would have a major effect for individuals who have not yet developed the necessary competence. O'Brien and Overton (1980 found that successful conditional reasoning could be elicited from the 12th graders but not from the 8th graders or younger subjects. In the present study, a 10th-grade group was added in order to assess the developmental trend. Although it was expected that the contradiction training would benefit the 12th graders but not the 8th graders, no specific prediction was made about the 10th grade performances.
With respect to cognitive style, it was expected that although a slower, systematic (i.e., "reflective") approach might enhance performance across grade levels, specific additional benefits should be derived from taking a reflective approach once logical competence was acquired. Furthermore, because correct task interpretation is a necessary precondition for successful conditional reasoning, it was expected that the additional beneficial effects of a reflective approach should be limited to the older groups that received contradiction training.
Method

Subjects
Thirty-six eighth graders (M = 13 years, 10 months, SD = 4.05 months), thirty-six I Oth graders (M = 15 years, 9 months, SD = 3.51 months), and thirty-six 12th graders {M = 17 years, 10 months, SD = 3.63 months) participated. All were male and enrolled in middle-class parochial grade schools or high schools in suburban Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Tasks and Design
Each subject was given an inference task, which presents the rule: "If a worker is years of age, or older, then that person will receive at least $350 each week." Each of 12 trials presents the age and salary for a single exemplar (see Table 1 ). The task was to decide, for each trial, which of three response choices could be inferred from the exemplar about the missing age in the rule. For example, following the exemplar of a 25-year-old who makes $200 each week, it would be correct to decide that the age in the rule is more than 25 (Choice 1), whereas it would be incorrect to infer that the age in the rule is 25 at most (Choice 2) or nothing at all (Choice 3). Although subjects tend to respond to exemplars in which the monetary amount is less than that stated in the rule with the correct choice (Choice I), there is a tendency for subjects to respond incorrectly to exemplars in which the amount is greater than that stated in the rule with Choice 2. The correct response is Choice 3, that is, that nothing at all can be inferred. Under interpretations of "if, then" statements other than the conditional, it is usual not to recognize that someone could make more than $350 without exceeding the age in the exemplar. Inspection of Table 1 shows that all ages below 45 are associated with salaries less than $350, whereas all ages above 45 are associated with salaries above $350 (except for Trial 6). For half of the subjects at each age, Trial 6 provides a contradictory exemplar for the erroneous inferences, whereas the other subjects received no such information. This contradiction between expectation and evidence allows the subject to realize the possibility of "not-p and q," a realization necessary for correct conditional reasoning. Thus there were two treatment groups. Additional details of the inference task are presented in O'Brien and Overton (1980) . Following the inference task, each subject was given an evaluation task designed to assess generalization of the treatment effects. The evaluation task used the following six conditional statements: (a) "If a worker is 70 years of age, or older, then that person must be retired;" (b) "If a rod is thin, then it must be flexible;" (c) "If you get a flu shot, then you won't get the flu;" (d) "If a card has a letter A on one side of it, then it has a number 3 on the other side of it;" (e) "If rilks are tall, then spritzers have teeth;" and (f) "If a student does the homework, then the student will get a good grade." The first statement was always given first, and the order of presentation of the other five statements was counterbalanced. Following the presentation of the conditional statements, the subject was presented with the four pairs of prepositional exemplars, that is, "p and q" "not-p and q" "p and notq" and "not-p and not-?," in random order. The task was to decide for each of the propositional exemplars whether or not it provides proof of the truth or falsity of the conditional statement. For example, the statement "If a rod is thin, then it must be flexible" requires the assessment that the exemplar "a rod that is thin and not flexible" (/? and not-#) provides such proof, whereas the other exemplars do not. Following the evaluation task, each subject was given the elementary form of the MFF test. Here cognitive style, that is, "impulsivity/reflectivity," is indexed by the subject's speed and errors in choosing from six figures the one which exactly matches the exemplar figure {See Messer, 1976) . This task was considered to assess each subject's attention to detail under conditions of response uncertainty. It was chosen to operationalize cognitive style since each subject would receive a score reflecting average response latency and total number of errors with respect to the individual's age group. Although there are alternate forms of the MFF, the elementary form was considered appropriate because it yielded reasonable variability at each grade level: latency standard deviations-11,96 (12th), 7.07 (10th), 7.35 (8th); error standard deviations-2.31 (12th), 2.92 (10th), 2.66 (8th).
Procedure
All subjects were given the inference task, the evaluation task, and the MFF in that order. The inference and evaluation tasks were administered to groups of four subjects of a given grade per session. The MFF was administered individually within 1 week of the first testing session.
During the first session, subjects were given the inference task booklet containing instructions on the cover, and a single trial on each succeeding page. Each page presented the information for that trial and the information from each preceding trial. The subjects read the written instructions as the tester read them aloud. The instructions state
There is a business that has a rule about the amount of money it pays people each week. What we know is
that IF SOMEONE IS YEARS OF AGE, OR OLDER, THEN THAT PERSON WILL RECEIVE AT LEAST $350 EACH
WEEK. We want to know what can be said about the missing age in the rule. I'm going to show you the age and amount of money that different workers make. After I tell you the age and amount of money that a worker makes, you tell me, on the basis of this information, what you can about the age in the rule. Do you understand?"
The tester then asked the subjects to turn to the first trial and to respond to it. Whether or not the subject was correct, the tester explained the reasoning behind the correct solution, that is, because the monetary amount in the exemplar is less than that in the rule, the age in the rule must be more than that in the exemplar. Trial I was used as an. example.
Each page in the booklet provided the rule with the missing age, a list of all previous exemplars (to control for memory), a new exemplar, and the three response choices: (a) the age in the rule is more than that in the given exemplar, (b) the age in the rule is that given in the exemplar at most; and (c) nothing at all can be said about the missing age in the rule. Subjects were told that the responses for a trial were to be made with respect to the age and salary of the exemplar for that trial. They were also shown all previous exemplars to allow them to see how the ages and salaries were related up to a given trial. The tester read aloud all information for the first four trials, then told the group to work at their own pace.
Within the first session, subjects were given the evaluation task following the completion of the inference task. The instructions on the cover of the test booklet were read aloud for the subjects. They were told that unlike the first task where every page had the same rule, each page of the evaluation task had its own rule. Then subjects were informed that under each propositional exemplar were slots labeled "yes" and "no." If they thought that the exemplar proved the rule either true or false they were to mark the "yes" response. If they thought that the exemplar proved neither truth nor falsity, they were to mark the "no" response.
During the second testing session each subject received the MFF test Response times to the first choice of a trial, and the number of errors per trial were noted. When the subject made an incorrect choice, the subject was told to respond again.
Scoring
Inference task. Conditional and other interpretations of the "if, then" rule lead to different responses on Trials 8, 9, and 11, the relevant trials following the training Trial 6 (see O'Brien & Overton, 1980 , for additional details). Responses were scored by giving 1 point for each response that was consistent with a formal conditional interpretation, that is, that the information tells nothing at all about the missing age in the rule. There was thus a maximum of 3 points per subject.
Evaluation task. One point was given for each "yes" response for the "p and not-#" exemplar type, and one point for each "no" response for each of the other three exemplar types. There was thus a maximum score of 4 points for each of the propositional exemplars summed across the six statements, for a total of 24 points.
MFF Response time to the first choice of a test item was measured with a stop watch. The number of errors each subject committed was summed across 12 trials. In order to yield a single score that incorporated each person's response time and errors with respect to the group performance of the person's grade level, the following / score conversions were computed. First, the total number of errors per subject was converted into a standard score using the standard deviation information from only the subject's grade level. Second, the same conversion was conducted on each subject's average response latency. Next, the latency standard score was subtracted from the error standard score. Subjects with net positive / scores were categorized "impulsive," because this summary score indicated generally more errors and shorter latencies with respect to subject's grade performance. Subjects with negative net / scores were deemed "reflective" because this summary score indicted generally longer latencies and fewer errors (See Salkind & Wright, 1977) .
Results
Inference Task
To assess the effect of introducing the contradiction training, a 3 (grade) X 2 (treat- (11) 1.11 (9) 0.56 (9) Evaluation task 9.29 (7) 11.27 (11) 13.11 (9) 10.56 (9) 10th grade 1.44 (9) 0.89 (9) 1.00(8) 0.38 (10) 12.22 (9) 9.78 (9) 13.60 (8) 11.50 (10) 12th grade 2.15(11) 1.60 (9) 1.29 (8) 1.00 (8) 16.31 (11) 11.80 (9) 11.86 (8) 11.73 (8) Note. Maximum score inference task = 3.0; maximum score evaluation task -24.0; Numbers in parentheses = N per grade -training -style subgroup. ment) X 2 (cognitive style) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed for the inference task scores using the regression approach to unequal cell sizes. Unequal cell sizes occurred because cognitive style was assessed after the two conditional reasoning tasks had been administered. Means for the inference task are presented in Table 2 . There was a significant main effect for grade, F{2, 96) = 6.41, p < .002. Newman-Keuls post hoc analyses at the .05 level of significance revealed that whereas the 12th graders performed significantly better than either the 8th or 10th grade subjects, there was no difference between the 8th and 10th graders. The main effect for Training and the Grade X Training interaction were not significant. Based on the results of O'Brien and Overton (1980, 1982) , planned comparisons were computed for the Grade X Training interaction. The a priori hypothesis was that the 12th graders would benefit from the introduction of the contradictory evidence. The analysis confirmed that the 12th graders who received the contradiction training performed better than the 12th graders who did not receive such training, t{34) = 2.76, p < .05, whereas there were no significant differences between training and control groups at either the 8th or 10th grades. These findings support the theoretical expectation that the prerequisite cognitive structures necessary to benefit from task training are available by the 12th grade; however, the introduction of the contradiction training was not an effective factor for the 8th or 10th graders.
The ANOVA also demonstrated a significant main effect for cognitive style, F(l, 96) = 8.60, p < .004. Subjects found to be "reflective" on the MFF performed significantly better than did those found to be "impulsive." Cognitive stye interacted neither with grade nor with training, nor was the Grade X Training X Cognitive Style interaction significant. The correlation between error and latency raw scores was -.625, p < .01. When age is partialed out of this correlation, it becomes -.545, p < .01. The overall correlation between inference scores and MFF standard scores was -.27, p < .002. When subjects were grouped by grade and treatment, only the 12th graders who received the contradictory evidence generated a significant correlation between these scores, -.45, p < .05.
Evaluation Task
In order to assess the generalizability of the training effect, a 3 (grade) X 2 (training) X 2 (cognitive style) X 4 (exemplar type) ANOVA was computed with repeated measures for exemplar type. This analysis used the regression approach to unequal cell sizes. The means for the evaluation task are presented in Table 2 .
The main effects for grade and training were not significant. Based on the findings of O'Brien and Overton (1980 , a significant effect for the Grade X Training interaction was expected, and planned comparisons were computed. The a priori hypothesis was that the 12th-grade subjects would perform better on the evaluation task following the contradiction training. The analysis showed that this was the case, f(34) = 2.81, p < .05, whereas there were no significant differences at either the 8th or 10th grades between the training and nontraining groups. It should also be noted that the more conservative ANOVA revealed a significant Grade X Training interaction, F(2, 96) -3.27, p < ,05. These findings suggest that only the 12th graders who received contradictory evidence were alerted to the conditional possibility of "not p and q," which subsequently enabled them to adequately test the truth status of conditional statements. Hence, given these manipulations, only the 12th graders evidence the necessary competence.
There was also a significant main effect for cognitive style, F{\, 96) = 5.57, p < .03. Reflective individuals scored significantly higher than those who were assessed as impulsive in their style. Furthermore, there was a significant Grade X Training X Cognitive Style interaction, F{2> 96) = 3.44, p < .04. Newman-Keuls within-grade comparisons of the Grade X Training X Style interaction at the .05 level of significance reveal that the major contribution of cognitive style is at the 12th grade. Here, reflective individuals in the contradiction training group performed significantly better than all other groups. The overall correlation across grade and treatment between evaluation scores and MFF standard scores is -.25, p < .04. It appears that once individuals have the prerequisite cognitive structures, a reflective style augments the expression of competence.
There was no significant main effect for exemplar type, nor an interaction of Grade X Exemplar Type, nor Training X Exemplar Type. However, the Grade X Training X Exemplar Type interaction was significant, F(6, Note. Maximum score per cell = 6.0. 248) = 3.49, p < .003, and the Grade X Cognitive Style X Exemplar Type interaction was significant, F{6, 288) = 2.63, p < .02. Newman-Keuls post hoc analyses at the .05 level of significance for the Grade X Training X Exemplar Type interaction revealed that the 12th graders who received the contradiction training performed significantly better than either the 8th-or lOth-grade training groups on the "p and not-#" exemplar type, and the 12th graders in the contradiction training groups performed significantly better than the 8th-grade training group with the "not-p and not-tf" exemplar type. There were no significant between-grade comparisons for the nontraining groups for any of the exemplar types. The within-grades comparisons reveal that significantly more errors were made with "p and q" exemplar type than each of the other types, and there were no differences among the other three types. These findings suggest that although the 12th graders committed as many errors of confirmation as subjects at the other grades, it was only this group that demonstrated insight into the structure of the conditional. The Grade X Training X Exemplar type cell means are presented in Table 3 .
Newman-Keuls comparisons for the Grade X Cognitive Style X Exemplar Type interaction reveal that all groups perform most poorly on the "p and q" type. The only other significant finding was that 12th-grade impulsives and lOth-grade impulsives differ on the "p and not-<?" exemplar type. The cell means for this interaction are presented in Table 4 .
In order to assess whether these findings are general across the varied content of the six statements of the evaluation task, an additional ANOVA was computed in which scores are summed across exemplar types rather than across statements. In this case, there is a maximum score of four for each subject for each statement. This is a 3 (grade) X 2 (treatment) X 2 (cognitive style) X 6 (statement) ANOVA with repeated measures for statement. Again, the regression procedure was used for treatment of unequal cell sizes.
As would be expected from the results of the ANOVA reported above, there was a significant main effect for cognitive style, F(l, 96) = 5.74, p < .02, a significant interaction of Grade X Treatment, F{2, 96) = 3.71, p < .03, and a significant interaction of Grade X Treatment X Style, F(2, 96) = 3.72, p < .03. There was also a significant main effect for statement, iH(5, 480) = 9.80, p < .001, and a significant interaction of Grade X Statement, F(10, 480) = 2.17, p< .02.
Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons at the .05 level of significance for the main effect for content reveal that the statement "if a worker is 70 years of age, or older, then that person must be retired" leads to significantly better performances than each of the other statements. O'Brien and Overton (1980) reported that this statement led to the best performances among the same set of statements with the selection task procedure. Furthermore, O'Brien and Overton (1980) reported that the statement "if rilks are tall, then spritzers have teeth" led to the worst performances on the selection task, and the present data from the evaluation task show that this statement led to worse performances than each of the others.
Newman-Keuls comparisons for the Grade X Statement interaction reveal that the superior performances with the statement concerning retired workers and their ages is due almost entirely to the 12th-grade group. Performances with this statement by 12th graders were significantly better than those of all other 17 cells. This suggests that the competence of the 12 graders is demonstrated most readily with the statement that is most similar to the material of the immediately preceding inference task, even when the contradiction training had not been provided.
Discussion
The present study investigated the development of formal conditional reasoning from the perspective of a competence-moderatorperformance approach (Overton, 1985; Overton & Newman, 1982) . A primary finding of this study, which is consistent with and extends the work of O'Brien and Overton (1980 , is that the first evidence of the prerequisite logical competence required for formal conditional reasoning appears at around the 12th grade. Neither the 8th-or lOth-grade subjects provided evidence on either the inference task or the evaluation task of insight into the formal structure of the conditional relationship. The 12th-grade subjects, on the other hand, significantly benefited from contradiction training, suggesting they had the logical competence available to them, and generalized their insight to a test of the conditions that test the truth or falsity of the conditional. It was only the 12th graders who consistently and accurately took counter examples, that is, "p and not <7," as falsifying and the other exemplars as irrelevant to the truth status of conditionals.
As a cautionary note, it should be stated that the foregoing interpretation is not meant to preclude the possibility that prepositional logical competence is acquired earlier than the 12th grade. It may, for example, be the case that by increasing the saliency of the contradiction manipulation, competence will be demonstrated at an earlier age. Furthermore, more converging evidence employing different tasks is needed. Both of these types of investigations are currently being conducted in our laboratory. But for the moment the evidence across a series of studies is consistent that the prerequisite competence is available by the 12th grade, and it is available in a manner that is readily accessible through a rather subtle experimental manipulation. The least logical part of the 12th graders' performance was the tendency to take confirming exemplars, that is, "p and q" as proof. However, this also replicates previous reported data (Moshman, 1979; O'Brien & Overton, 1980 , 1982 O'Brien, Costa, & Overton, 1983) . The reasons for the persistence of this error also require further study.
That task interpretation operates as a moderator variable was also demonstrated by the 12th graders' performance. Here the successful performance of the group receiving the procedure designed to alert them to fallacious interpretations of the conditional stands in contrast to the performance of the group that was left to its own devices to generate their own interpretation of the "if, then" statements. It seems clear that although some subjects who possess the requisite competence for a formal conditional interpretation will, in fact, spontaneously generate this interpretation, a fair assessment of the underlying competence requires the introduction of procedures to countermand the preference among others to generate alternative interpretations.
Attention to detail as assessed by the cognitive style variable was also found to operate as a moderator of competence. For the original inference task, a reflective style simply enhanced performance regardless of the logical competence of the subject, and regardless of whether the subject received contradiction training. However, for the generalization task the benefits of a reflective style were manifested primariy in those individuals who had the logical competence to perform successfully and who had received training alerting them to the appropriate conditional interpretation. Thus it appears that once the conditions of competence and correct interpretation are set a reflective style acts as a moderator variable in further enhancing performance.
